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Survey Evidence from European Firms 
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Firms have multiple options at the time of adjusting their wage bills. However, previous 
literature has mainly focused on base wages. We broaden the analysis beyond downward 
rigidity in base wages by investigating the use of other margins of labour cost adjustment 
at the firm level. Using data from a unique survey, we find that European firms make 
frequent use of other, more flexible, components of compensation to adjust the cost of 
labour. Changes in bonuses and non-pay benefits are some of the potential margins firms 
use to reduce costs. We also show how the margins of adjustment chosen are affected by 
firm and worker characteristics. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Apart from a decrease in base wages, firms can use other ways of reducing labour costs 
when faced by negative external shocks, for example cutting bonuses and benefits, 
encouraging earlier retirement and hiring workers at lower wages than those who have 
recently quit. The adjustment of non-wage labour costs has gained attention in the policy 
debate for two main reasons. First, non-wage labour costs represent a substantial part of 
total compensation. Since firms are primarily concerned with total compensation per 
employee, assessment of the flexibility of non-wage labour costs is as important as 
evaluation of the degree of wage flexibility. Second, in an environment of sticky prices 
and nominal wages, non-wage labour costs become an important tool of adjustment to 
external shocks, allowing the effects of negative demand shocks on the firm’s 
employment to be dampened.  
Using a unique survey of firms from 12 countries of the European Union conducted in the 
second half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 within the framework of the Wage 
Dynamics Network coordinated by the European Central Bank, we examine the 
importance and determinants of alternative strategies firms might use to adjust their 
labour costs. In our survey, we asked firms’ managers directly about their use of these 
policies in the recent past. In this paper we analyse the factual responses of what types of 
margins firms have used in the last five years preceding the survey. Specifically, we are 
able to identify the incidence of the following six labour cost-saving strategies: reduce or 
eliminate bonus payments; reduce non-pay benefits; change shift assignments or shift 
premia; slow or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; recruit new employees at a 
lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; and encourage early retirement to 
replace high-wage employees by entrants with lower wages.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we document comparable information 
on labour cost adjustment practices beyond base wages for a large set of EU countries and 
sectors. This allows us to discuss the relative importance of each individual strategy 
across countries characterised by different sets of laws and institutions governing their 
labour markets. Our survey shows that firms fairly commonly use strategies to reduce 
labour costs other than reducing base wages – 63% of the firms’ managers said they had 
used at least one other margin of adjustment in the recent past, and 58% had used at least 
one of the six margins explicitly identified in the survey. We find substantial 
heterogeneity in the use of these strategies across countries and firms, depending on firm 
characteristics and labour market institutions. 
Second, we examine characteristics of firms and the environments in which they operate 
that determine the relative importance of each type of labour cost adjustment mechanism. 
The use of each margin is related to several firm characteristics, such as relative size or 
skills distribution, as well as several indicators of the economic environment in which 
they operate. In particular, larger firms show greater room for manoeuvre with respect to 
using any of these strategies in order to adjust labour costs. Different indicators of the 
severity of competition suggest that firms in more competitive environments are more   The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Survey Evidence from European Firms   3 
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likely to use some of these strategies more heavily. Furthermore, we find that the 
presence of unions in wage setting is associated with greater use of most of the strategies. 
A plausible explanation is that unions limit the flexibility of wages, pushing firms 
towards alternative labour cost-cutting strategies.  
Finally, we show how the use of these adjustment practices can be related to firms’ 
experience regarding nominal wage rigidity, as well as to the extent of wage indexation 
operating in the firm. When we control for different indicators of wage rigidity (either 
nominal wage rigidity or alternative definitions of wage indexation) the impact of 
unionisation on the use of alternative margins persists. Moreover, we find that firms 
subject to nominal wage rigidities are much more likely to use each of the six cost-cutting 
strategies. This indicates that there is some degree of substitutability between wage 
flexibility and the flexibility of other labour cost components, and that this substitutability 
is not limited by the presence of unions in wage setting.  4   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
1. Introduction 
Wages of incumbent workers are seldom cut, even in the face of large negative shocks. 
During the last few years, a growing body of literature using micro data has documented 
the importance of downward wage rigidities in several countries and over a range of time 
periods. In the US, clear signs of resistance to nominal wage cuts are found in all studies 
(see among others Kahn, 1997; Altonji and Devereux, 2000; and Lebow et al., 2003). 
More recently, a comprehensive cross-country study conducted in the framework of the 
International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP) has demonstrated the existence of 
downward rigidity in real wages in addition to nominal wages in many European 
countries (Dickens et al., 2007, 2008).  
Understanding the relative flexibility of labour costs is essential for a better understanding 
of the workings of the economy at the macro level. From a monetary policy perspective, 
the adjustment of marginal costs to economic shocks determines the slope of the Philips 
curve in New Keynesian Models (Galí and Gertler, 1999). From a labour perspective, 
understanding the links between wage rigidities and unemployment was emphasised by 
Layard et al. (1991), and most of the empirical micro literature on wage rigidities retained 
this subject as the main motivation for analysis.
1 However, even if base wages are rigid, 
does such wage rigidity necessarily imply rigid labour cost structures? Firms have other 
margins of adjustment beyond base wages to manage their wage bills, including the 
adjustment of flexible pay components such as bonuses or fringe benefits, the adjustment 
of labour costs via reorganisation of production, or the use of labour turnover as a tool to 
adjust labour costs to changes in economic activity. These other margins have hardly been 
studied in the existing literature. 
This paper broadens the discussion of the relative rigidity of wages to include the 
flexibility of other adjustment mechanisms that involve the use of labour inputs. Using a 
unique survey from a large sample of European firms, we are able to identify the 
incidence of the following labour cost-saving strategies: reduce or eliminate bonus 
payments; reduce non-pay benefits; change shift assignments or shift premia; slow or 
freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; recruit new employees at a lower wage 
level than those who left voluntarily; and encourage early retirement to replace high-wage 
employees by entrants with lower wages. The paper makes three contributions to the 
literature. First, we document comparable information on labour cost adjustment practices 
beyond base wages for a large set of EU countries and sectors. This allows us to discuss 
the relative importance of each individual strategy across countries characterised by 
different sets of laws and institutions governing their labour markets. Second, we examine 
the characteristics of firms and the environments in which they operate that determine the 
relative importance of each type of labour cost adjustment mechanism. Finally, we show 
how the use of these adjustment practices can be related to firms’ experience regarding 
nominal wage rigidity, as well as to the extent of wage indexation operating in the firm. 
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In order to address these questions, we use a novel firm-level survey that contains detailed 
qualitative information for a large number of firms in 12 EU countries. The survey was 
carried out within the framework of the Wage Dynamics Network, a research network 
sponsored by a consortium of EU central banks and coordinated by the European Central 
Bank. The most important advantage of using qualitative information from a firm survey 
is the possibility of addressing a broad set of adjustment practices, most of which are 
typically not observable even in the richest matched employer-employee datasets and are 
therefore new to the literature.  
Our survey shows that firms fairly commonly use strategies to reduce labour costs other 
than reducing base wages – 63% of the firms’ managers said they had used at least one 
other margin of adjustment in the recent past, and 58% had used at least one of the six 
margins explicitly identified in the survey. Their use of each margin is related to several 
firm characteristics, such as relative size or skills distribution, as well as several indicators 
of the economic environment in which they operate. Firms in more competitive 
environments tend to use some of these strategies more heavily. Similarly, the degree and 
characteristics of union involvement in the wage-setting process shape the need and 
ability of firms to use different margins. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the 
survey and the sample used in the paper. Section 3 describes various compensation 
channels – other than base wages – that firms may use to reduce labour costs and the 
frequency with which they are used in different countries and sectors. Section 4 relates 
the choice of cost reduction methods to firm characteristics and attributes of the economic 
environment in which they operate. Section 5 looks at the relationship between these 
alternative margins of cost-cutting strategies and the recent firm experience of nominal 
wage rigidity and indexation mechanisms. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Survey Design and Sample Characteristics  
The firm survey was conducted in the second half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 in 
16 European Union countries, 12 of which included the questions on alternative margins 
of labour cost adjustment analysed here: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia.
2 The survey 
was carried out by the national central banks, and all countries used as the basis for the 
survey a harmonised questionnaire developed in the context of the Eurosystem Wage 
Dynamics Network, a research network analysing wage and labour cost dynamics. The 
collection of information varied across countries – the survey was conducted in most 
cases by traditional mail, but phone and face-to-face interviews were also used. The 
survey was directed at the company’s CEO or senior-level human resources management 
employee(s).  
The harmonised questionnaire contained a core set of questions – referring to general firm 
characteristics and the firms’ price and wage-setting strategies – that were included in all 
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countries’ questionnaires.
3 An enlarged questionnaire including the relevant questions for 
this study was sent to 12 countries. This harmonised questionnaire was further adapted by 
some countries to account for specific country characteristics and different institutional 
frameworks, but it retained its comparability in all the dimensions covered in this paper.  
The sample frame in each country was based on firms with at least five employees. The 
sectors covered are manufacturing, energy, construction, market services, non-market 
services, trade and financial intermediation; there are, however, differences in the sectoral 
coverage of individual countries. The sample used here covers around 12,000 firms 
representing around 37.2 million employees.
4 A description of the distribution of the 
sample by country, sector and size is provided in Appendix 2.  
In order to make the results representative of the total population, the sample statistics 
presented in the following sections use employment-adjusted weights. For each 
firm/observation these weights indicate the number of employees each observation 
represents in the population. They can be roughly calculated as the population 
employment divided by the number of firms (in each stratum) in the realised sample.
5 For 
a detailed description of the construction of weights see Appendix 3.
6 
 
3. Non-Wage Cost-Cutting strategies 
Apart from a decrease in base wages, firms can use other ways of reducing labour costs 
when faced by negative exogenous shocks, for example cutting bonuses and benefits, 
encouraging earlier retirement and hiring workers at lower wages than those who have 
recently quit. The adjustment of non-wage labour costs has gained attention in the policy 
debate for two main reasons. First, non-wage labour costs represent a substantial (and 
rising) part of total compensation (see, for example, Oyer, 2005, and Chen and Funke, 
2003). Since firms are primarily concerned with total compensation per employee, 
assessment of the flexibility of non-wage labour costs is as important as evaluation of the 
degree of wage flexibility (Lebow and Saks, 2003). Second, in an environment of sticky 
prices and wages, non-wage labour costs become an important tool of adjustment to 
exogenous shocks, allowing the effects of negative demand shocks on the firm’s 
employment to be dampened (Chen and Funke, 2005). 
Non-wage labour costs can be divided into two broad categories – statutory and non-
statutory. Statutory non-wage labour costs, for example employers’ social security 
contributions, are imposed by law; a firm cannot change them with respect to a particular 
worker. Non-statutory non-wage labour costs are either determined by collective 
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agreements or set at the discretion of the employer. Private pension schemes, bonuses and 
benefits belong to this category. Hence, firms have certain freedom in using non-statutory 
non-wage labour costs (or at least a part of them) to adjust to shocks. It is non-statutory 
labour costs “addressable” at the firm-level that we intend to study from the survey data. 
Additionally, firms might use labour turnover or internal reorganisation as a tool to 
achieve labour cost flexibility. They might use voluntary or involuntary resignations or 
retirements of high-tenure (and hence high-wage) workers for younger workers who are 
willing to work at a lower wage. Similarly, they might limit the extent of promotions or 
use shift work as a cost-cutting strategy during an economic downturn. 
In our survey, we asked firms’ managers directly about their use of these other policies in 
the recent past. In this paper we use factual questions about what types of margins firms 
have used in the recent past. Specifically, we identified the following main strategies to 
cut labour costs (other than wages) reported by the majority of national surveys (see 
question 18 in Appendix 4) by asking: Has any of the following strategies ever been used 
in your firm to reduce labour costs? Firms were allowed to choose as many options as 
they wished from the following list:  
•  reduce or eliminate bonus payments; 
•  reduce or eliminate non-pay benefits; 
•  change shift assignments or shift premia; 
•  slow or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; 
•  recruit new employees at a lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; 
•  encourage early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with 
lower wages; 
•  use other strategies.  
 
Obviously, different margins are likely to be used to respond to different shocks. As an 
example, changing the workforce composition could be used following a permanent 
shock to the firm, while changing shift assignments or shift premia might be a more 
common reaction to a temporary shock. This is beyond the scope of the factual survey 
questions on which this paper is based. However, these factual questions have the great 
advantage of being more likely to solicit precise information. Using hypothetical 
questions from the same survey, Bertola et al. (2010) look into the reaction of firms to 
different types of shocks, distinguishing the adjustment of wages, prices, margins, output 
and employment. 
Summary statistics of the percentage of firms (weighted by employment) that use at least 
one of the first six strategies listed above are presented in Table 1. It clearly indicates that 
firms make extensive use of different cost-cutting strategies in Europe, although there is 
substantial variability across countries. While in Lithuania all workers have seen how at 
least one of the strategies has affected their labour relations, in Portugal the percentage of 
affected workers falls to 40%. On average, 63% of the workers in our sample have been 8   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
affected, and differences in the incidence of these adjustment mechanisms between euro 
area and non-euro area countries do not seem to be particularly relevant.  
Perhaps the first and most striking feature of Table 1 is that the prevalence of individual 
strategies varies quite substantially across countries. The reduction of bonus payments is 
the most common method used by firms outside the euro area: in the Czech Republic 
(32%), Estonia (40%), Lithuania (41%) and Poland (24%). The western European 
countries appear less likely to use bonuses in order to reduce costs, with the exception of 
Italy, where almost a quarter of firms report using this method. Labour turnover instead 
seems to be an important element of adjustment in Western Europe.
7 Hiring new 
employees at lower rates than those who left the company is the most important 
adjustment mechanism in Belgium (26%), France (39%), Italy (46%) and to some extent 
Portugal, where it affects 16% of employees. Similarly, while using early retirement as an 
adjustment tool is never the main method of adjustment, it is fairly commonly used in 
these countries. In Belgium (19%), France (30%) and Italy (20%), the average use of 
early retirement is above the total mean (16.5%).  
A third group of countries shows substantial flexibility regarding internal work 
organisation. This is the case, for instance, in Hungary, where more than 73% of the 
workers in our sample have been affected by at least one of the following strategies: shift 
changes and the slowing down of promotions, as an attempt by their employers to cut 
labour costs. This is also the case in Italy, where 50% of employees have been affected by 
at least one of these practices. The strategy least used by firms is the reduction of benefits. 
This demonstrates that benefits are a less flexible labour cost component than bonuses 
(affecting 15% of workers in total, as against 23% in the case of bonuses).  
In addition to the variation across countries, we find that the choice of strategies also 
tends to differ across sectors (Table 2). The use of cheaper hires to replace workers who 
leave the firm is the dominant strategy in most sectors. Firms in manufacturing report a 
relatively even spread across the different strategies. The energy and financial 
intermediation sectors are the most likely to target bonuses and benefits when trying to 
reduce costs. Early retirement is the strategy least likely to be followed: this is similar to 
the pattern in Table 1, where France was the only country with a significant proportion of 
firms to use this strategy. The use of non-wage cost-cutting strategies has the lowest 
proportion in non-market services.   
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Use at least 
one strategy 
Belgium  1,431  0.184 0.079 0.072 0.150 0.264 0.189  0.460 
Czech Republic  399  0.322 0.075 0.111 0.019 0.087 0.089  0.679 
Estonia  366  0.402 0.205 0.211 0.062 0.162 0.026  0.936 
France  2,029  0.147 0.061  n.a  0.154 0.390 0.303  0.586 
Greece 
(a)  402  0.204 0.124  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.835 
Hungary  2,006  0.227 0.119 0.383 0.351 0.265 0.102  0.672 
Ireland  985  0.169 0.078 0.160 0.094 0.370 0.098  0.909 
Italy  953  0.256 0.218 0.260 0.340 0.456 0.202  0.712 
Lithuania  337  0.410 0.250 0.199 0.106 0.179 0.027  1.000 
Poland  908  0.236 0.163 0.124 0.128 0.237 0.109  0.505 
Portugal  1,436  0.137 0.084 0.107 0.140 0.162 0.000  0.395 
Slovenia  666  0.135 0.128 0.091 0.189 0.158 0.089  0.575 
Total  11,918  0.226 0.147 0.191 0.206 0.323 0.165  0.631 
Euro area  7,902  0.205 0.146 0.212 0.246 0.387 0.203  0.645 
Non-euro area  4,016  0.267 0.149 0.163 0.134 0.207 0.097  0.604 
 
Note: Proportion of firms that use given strategy, weighted by employment. 
(a) In Greece the question was formulated in a different way. Therefore, the last 
column refers to the proportion of firms that have reduced bonuses, non-pay benefits, overtime hours and number of employees and have engaged in 
restructuring (the former three options replaced the change in shifts, slow promotion, cheaper hires and early retirement options). 
 





















Use at least 
one strategy 
Manufacturing  5,057  0.209 0.135 0.189  0.204 0.319  0.177  0.615 
Energy  107  0.301 0.216 0.040  0.127 0.182  0.253  0.667 
Construction  932  0.210 0.149 0.113  0.130 0.166  0.058  0.521 
Trade  2,277  0.250 0.173 0.220  0.216 0.374  0.109  0.648 
Market services  3,064  0.233 0.147 0.212  0.219 0.330  0.189  0.662 
Financial intermediation  225  0.300 0.149 0.050  0.229 0.365  0.294  0.620 
Non-market services  192  0.096 0.045 0.118  0.118 0.183  0.041  0.426 
 
Note: Proportion of firms that use given strategy, weighted by employment.  The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Survey Evidence from European Firms   11 
 
 
The cost reduction strategies are obviously not mutually exclusive and we find that firms will 
relatively frequently use more than one of the methods. Half of the firms in the sample reported 
having used non-wage cost reductions at some point. Of these firms, slightly less than half (49%) 
used one margin of adjustment only, 30% used a combination of two methods and 14% used a 
combination of three. The remaining 8% used more than three of the six methods identified.
8 This 
leads us to ask if certain combinations of the strategies are more likely to be used than others.  
Table 3 reports correlation coefficients for the pairings of different strategies. As might be 
expected due to their complementary nature, reductions in benefits and bonuses have one of the 
highest correlations (0.28). Cheaper hires to replace workers who left voluntarily and 
encouragement of early retirement to create vacancies for lower-paid, more junior staff is another 
pairing with a high correlation (0.23), suggesting that some firms use turnover to reduce labour 
costs. Finally, a third strategic combination regards the use of the company’s internal wage 
structure, with changes in shift patterns and slowing of promotions making up the third pair of 
strategies with the highest correlation.  
Table 3: Correlations between Non-Wage Labour Cost Reduction Strategies  
 
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Number of observations: 9,170.   
 
 
4. The Choice among Non-Wage Cost-Cutting Strategies 
Why are firms using some of these strategies and others not? Our survey can provide some 
guidance regarding the determinants of engaging in each of the cost-cutting strategies identified 
above. We start by analysing in more detail the determinants of using any of the six labour cost 
adjustment strategies proposed by the survey. We consider a set of firm characteristics such as the 
structure of its labour force (the share of high and low-skilled blue and white collars and the share 
of workers holding a temporary versus an open-ended contract), indicators of firm size, and the 
share of labour costs in total costs.  
We also consider two different indicators of product market competition. Our first indicator is 
labelled as “perceived competition” and ranks the degree of competition according to the 
managers’ answers to a direct question: To what extent does your firm experience competition for 
its main product? in four categories: severe, strong, weak and no competition. The second 
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Reduce bonuses  1          
Reduce benefits  0.2793 1         
Change shifts  0.1073 0.1327  1       
Slow promotions  0.141 0.1901  0.3175  1     
Cheaper hires  0.1318 0.1432 0.1329  0.2133  1   
Early retirement  0.1299 0.1426 0.1376  0.2048  0.2342  1 12   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   
indicator is labelled as “implied competition” and responds to the managers’ answers to the 
following question: Suppose that the main competitor for your firm’s main product decreases its 
prices; how likely is your firm to react by decreasing its own price? Depending on whether the 
price responses are very likely, likely, not likely or not at all, we again rank the degree of 
perceived competition in four categories: severe, strong, weak and no competition respectively. 
Similarly, we consider two different sets of indicators of union activity. First, we asked managers 
about the percentage of workers that were covered by collective agreements. We label this 
variable “coverage”. Second, we asked managers about the predominant wage setting that applies 
to their firms, which allows us to differentiate four categories: individual negotiations, firm-level 
agreements with unions, sectoral/national wage-bargaining agreements and both (firm-level and 
sectoral/national agreements). Summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are 
presented in Table A6 in Appendix 2. 
Table 4 highlights the relationship between firm characteristics and the tendency to rely on any 
labour cost-cutting strategy. The analysis is based on the results of probit regressions, where the 
dependent variable is 1 if the firm has used at least one of the labour cost adjustment strategies 
and 0 otherwise. Importantly, all the specifications include country fixed effects, which eliminate 
possible biases due to idiosyncrasies in the country questionnaires (e.g. due to language 
differences in the formulation of the questions or data collection methods). Similarly, all 
specifications include sectoral dummies. 
We find that larger firms make more extensive use of all margins of labour cost-cutting strategies. 
According to the estimates presented in column 1 of Table 4, in large firms (above 200 
employees) the probability of using non-wage strategies increases by 23 percentage points with 
respect to the baseline category (firms below 20 employees). The positive relation between firm 
size and the use of cost-cutting strategies is monotonically increasing and highly significant 
across all specifications. We also find that firms which have a higher share of labour costs in total 
costs have a tendency to use labour cost-cutting strategies more heavily, which is reassuring. 
Perhaps less straightforward is the fact that, within sectors and countries, firms with a higher 
share of white collars use these cost-cutting margins more extensively. This is especially 
significant if we differentiate between low-skilled blue and white collars. In all but one of our 
specifications we find a significantly negative statistical relationship, indicating that a higher 
share of low-skilled blue collars reduces the probability of engaging in any of the labour cost-
cutting strategies identified.  
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 present our alternative indicators of product market competition. 
Their message is broadly consistent, indicating a positive association between the use of labour 
cost-cutting strategies and the intensity of competition. If we consider the indicator of perceived 
competition, the relationship is clearly monotonically increasing, with weak competition 
increasing the use of the margins by 9 percentage points (pp), strong competition by 12 pp and 
severe competition by 15 pp with respect to no competition. The relationship is non-monotonic 
but positive and significant with the indicator of “implied competition”. In this case we find that 
firms operating in strong or severe competition environments are unambiguously related to more 
intense use of cost-cutting margins than firms facing no, or weak, competition. The impact of 
competition is reinforced by the positive and statistically significant association between the 
share of exports and the use of cost-cutting margins, since firms operating in international 
markets are expected to face even higher competitive pressures.   The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Survey Evidence from European Firms   13 
 
 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 consider the role of wage setting and its influence on the use of 
labour cost-cutting margins. In column 3, we find that firms characterised by higher union 
coverage are more likely to use such margins of labour cost adjustment. This might indicate that 
unions exert pressure on firms that results in rigid base wage structures. As a result, firms try to 
overcome such restrictions by acting on other margins. We will explore this hypothesis further in 
the next section. Note that our variable for union coverage is available for a restricted set of firms. 
Hence, its inclusion results in losing almost 15% of the sample. However, the impact of 
unionisation is confirmed in column 4, where we replace the indicator of union coverage by three 
dummies that characterise the type of union contracts applying to the firm: firm level, 
sectoral/national level, and both. Table A4 in Appendix 2 shows the distribution by country of 
this variable. We find that any sort of union involvement in wage negotiations results in a higher 
likelihood of using non-wage adjustment mechanisms with respect to firms that are mainly 
characterised by individual negotiations. We do not find significant differences between the three 
levels of wage negotiations outlined above.   
  14   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   
Table 4: Non-Wage Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Probit Regressions 
 
Dependent variable equals one if at least one margin is used 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Low-skilled blue collar (%)  -0.046*  -0.052*  -0.060**  -0.042 
    (0.099) (0.055) (0.044) (0.136) 
High-skilled  blue  collar  (%)  -0.021 -0.010 -0.031 -0.019 
    (0.500) (0.745) (0.343) (0.541) 
Low-skilled  white  collar  (%) 0.024 0.042 0.019 0.025 
    (0.532) (0.274) (0.646) (0.531) 
Exporting  firm  0.027**  0.032** 0.027* 0.028** 
    (0.046) (0.015) (0.068) (0.039) 
Share of labour costs  0.060*  0.097***  0.068**  0.075** 
    (0.056) (0.002) (0.044) (0.017) 
Temporary workers (%)  0.005  -0.013  0.024  0.009 
    (0.874) (0.708) (0.508) (0.794) 
Size=20–49  0.109*** 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.106*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=50–199  0.171*** 0.182*** 0.132*** 0.162*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.228*** 0.238*** 0.168*** 0.210*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Implied competition – weak    0.019     
     (0.454)     
Implied competition – strong    0.090***     
     (0.000)     
Implied competition – severe    0.076***     
     (0.004)     
Perceived competition – weak  0.088**    0.112***  0.098** 
   (0.032)    (0.009)  (0.017) 
Perceived competition – strong  0.124***    0.149***  0.135*** 
   (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Perceived competition – severe  0.150***    0.171***  0.159*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Coverage     0.051***   
       (0.001)   
Only  outside  agreement      0.057*** 
        (0.007) 
Only  firm  agreement      0.072*** 
        (0.003) 
Firm and outside agreement        0.065** 
        (0.013) 
Observations  7738 7979 6623 7634 
 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects. 
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We move next to the analysis of the determinants of the six labour cost adjustment strategies 
proposed by the survey considered separately. Table 5 presents the estimates of probit regressions 
for the likelihood of using each strategy, including our preferred set of regressors: firm 
characteristics, the indicator of perceived competition, and three separate dummies characterising 
the bargaining environment dominating wage negotiations. Some of the effects identified in Table 
4 go in essentially the same way for all of the margins. Firm size is a clear example, being 
positively related to the probability of using each individual margin.  
Worker characteristics, on the other hand, have different effects on the likelihood of choosing 
each of these margins. Firms with higher percentages of blue-collar workers are less likely to use 
bonus and benefit reduction than those with a high proportion of high-skilled white-collar 
workers, probably reflecting greater use of flexible pay components among the latter group. The 
choice of slowing promotions is also negatively related to the percentage of low-skilled blue-
collar workers, suggesting that white-collar workers are more frequently involved in tournaments 
for promotions. Such competitions can be slowed down by firms during downturns or periods of 
restructuring. On the other hand, firms using a higher proportion of blue-collar workers are 
significantly more likely to use changes in shifts if they want to reduce costs. This is easy to 
rationalise if we think that shift work is more common among blue than white-collar workers. 
Firms using temporary workers are associated with a greater probability of the firm choosing to 
reduce benefits as a cost-cutting strategy. We do not find significant differences in the use of 
bonuses among temporary and permanent workers. Not surprisingly instead, early retirement is a 
tool more commonly used among firms with a greater proportion of workers with open-ended 
contracts.  
As regards product market competition, we find that the effects outlined above are mainly driven 
by three margins: reduction in benefits, the replacement of voluntary leavers with the recruitment 
of new employees at lower wages, and changes in shift assignments. Some competition is 
associated with a significant increase in the first two strategies, while changing shifts is only 
pushed as an alternative adjustment mechanism by severe competition. Finally, we looked at the 
differentiated impact of wage-bargaining regimes on the alternative margins under consideration. 
As before, the presence of unions in the wage-setting process is associated with more intensive 
use of all margins with the exception of bonus reductions. This suggests that unions might limit 
not only the flexibility of base wages, as suggested by previous literature, but also the use of 
flexible wage components. With the exception of changes in shifts, we tend to find that the 
presence of agreements at the firm level is in general associated with more intensive use of each 
margin of adjustment. Using early retirement to replace high wage workers with new entrants at 
lower wages is a good example of this pattern. Outside agreements are associated with a 4.2 pp 
increase in the use of this tool, while in firms with predominantly firm-level agreements the use 
of this adjustment mechanism increases by 7.4 pp with respect to firms who bargain with workers 
individually. Having instead a firm and a sectoral/national-level agreement applying jointly 
reinforces this effect by up to 9.8 pp with respect to individual negotiations. The only exception 
concerns changes in shift assignments. In this case, outside agreements increase their use by 5 pp, 
and this is reinforced by the joint occurrence of firm and higher-level agreements. However, 
firms that apply firm-level agreements only do not use this strategy differently than firms 
characterised by individual negotiations. 16   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   
Table 5: Non-Wage Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Probit Regressions 
 














Low-skilled blue collar (%)  -0.040*  -0.035**  0.069***  -0.066***  -0.021  0.034 
   (0.051)  (0.017)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.378)  (0.113) 
High-skilled blue collar (%)  -0.034  -0.060***  0.051**  -0.016  0.011  0.029 
   (0.151)  (0.000)  (0.046)  (0.445)  (0.671)  (0.249) 
Low-skilled white collar (%)  0.036  -0.027  0.024  0.028  -0.035  0.091*** 
   (0.217)  (0.206)  (0.462)  (0.307)  (0.311)  (0.002) 
Exporting firm  0.021**  0.010  -0.007  -0.003  0.017  -0.008 
   (0.044)  (0.175)  (0.518)  (0.756)  (0.132)  (0.398) 
Share of labour costs  0.048**  0.009  -0.023  0.045**  0.055**  0.004 
   (0.044)  (0.624)  (0.364)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.864) 
Only outside agreement  0.028 0.025* 0.052***  -0.021  0.015 0.042** 
   (0.110)  (0.052)  (0.007)  (0.177)  (0.417)  (0.033) 
Only firm agreement  0.011  0.033**  0.015  0.016  0.038*  0.074*** 
   (0.536)  (0.013)  (0.412)  (0.328)  (0.068)  (0.000) 
Firm and outside agreement  0.025  0.041**  0.085***  -0.011  0.011  0.098*** 
   (0.233)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.588)  (0.614)  (0.000) 
Temporary workers (%)  0.007  0.032*  0.062**  0.024  0.031  -0.066** 
   (0.784)  (0.070)  (0.021)  (0.300)  (0.286)  (0.015) 
Size=20–49 0.046***  0.023**  0.049***  0.047***  0.097***  0.058*** 
   (0.002)  (0.040)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size=50–199 0.068***  0.035***  0.080***  0.071***  0.109***  0.068*** 
   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size=200+ 0.097***  0.050***  0.070***  0.090***  0.156***  0.148*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Perceived comp – weak  0.033  0.052*  0.032  0.005  0.118***  -0.012 
   (0.330)  (0.064)  (0.356)  (0.870)  (0.006)  (0.666) 
Perceived comp – strong  0.045  0.045**  0.030  0.029  0.115***  -0.034 
   (0.127)  (0.045)  (0.313)  (0.268)  (0.002)  (0.181) 
Perceived comp – severe  0.038  0.053**  0.065**  0.035  0.138***  -0.001 
   (0.206)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.180)  (0.000)  (0.982) 
Observations 7634  7634  5689  7306  7306  6148 
 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. 
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects. 
  
5. Wage Rigidity and Non-Wage Labour Cost Adjustment 
Are firms subject to wage rigidity more likely to use the alternative margins of adjusting labour 
costs? In the previous section we found that firms are more likely to use other channels of labour 
cost adjustment besides reducing base wages if unions are present in wage setting. In parallel, 
there is now an ample literature (Dickens et al., 2007, Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008, and Babecký 
et al., 2010, the last-mentioned using this dataset) suggesting a prominent role of unions in the 
determination of downward (nominal or real) wage rigidity. Hence, it is natural to ask in our   The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Survey Evidence from European Firms   17 
 
 
framework if firms subject to some form of wage rigidity are more likely to use any of these other 
margins of adjustment.  
Our survey allows us to construct three different measures of wage rigidity. We asked directly the 
managers of firms if they had ever cut or frozen wages during the previous five years. Following 
the identifying assumption in some of the micro literature on downward nominal wage rigidity 
(see, for instance, Nickell and Quintini, 2003), we regard firms that froze wages at any point 
during this period as showing evidence of nominal wage rigidity. Most probably this reflects 
downward nominal wage rigidity, since an analysis of more than 360 yearly wage change 
distributions for individuals who stayed in the same job in a large number of countries suggests 
that upward nominal wage rigidity, as suggested by “menu costs”, is not an important element of 
wage setting (Dickens et al., 2007). However, our data does not allow us to disentangle 
symmetric from asymmetric nominal wage rigidity, so we cannot rule out that some of these 
wage freezes reflect pure menu costs. Nonetheless, they constitute a symptom of rigid wage 
structures. An important element to take into account is that this measure refers to the previous 
five years. Since the survey was conducted in late 2007 and early 2008, in most cases the firms 
were responding about the incidence of wage freezes in an upswing, or a period of relatively 
favourable conditions. Hence, we are most probably under-estimating the incidence of downward 
nominal wage rigidity. In this case, to the extent that the latent association between downward 
nominal wage rigidity and the use of alternative margins of labour cost adjustment is positive, our 
estimates would be a lower bound of the true impact.  
 We also asked firms if they had a policy that linked wage changes to inflation. Firms that replied 
yes to this question were further asked if the link with inflation was automatic or discretionary 
and whether it was with respect to past or expected inflation. Using information from these 
questions, we consider two different definitions of wage indexation, which we view as a 
particular form of real wage rigidity. We consider firms to apply a “strict indexation rule” if they 
have an automatic link between wages and past or expected inflation, i.e. if they apply automatic 
wage indexation. This form of indexation is usually considered an institutional feature of a 
country’s or sector’s wage formation settings. Alternatively, we consider firms to apply a “formal 
or informal indexation rule” if they link or take into account inflation at the time of setting wages. 
The second definition is broader, applies to more firms and shows more variation between firms. 
It is therefore less well captured by country-level institutional information (see Du Caju et al., 
2008). 
Table 6 shows that indexation is much more prevalent in our data (17% of firms are affected by 
strict indexation rules, while 35% apply some form of formal or informal indexation) than wage 
freezes (only 9% of firms are affected), which is consistent with other evidence on wage rigidity 
in most continental European countries, as opposed to the US and the UK (see, for example, 
Dickens et al., 2008). Wage freezes appear more common than average in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Lithuania and the Netherlands. They are considerably rarer than average in Spain, 
France, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia. Automatic indexation mechanisms are especially prevalent 
in Belgium, Spain and Slovenia, and much less so in Italy, Estonia and Poland. Overall, we find 
that the non-euro area member states of the EU are almost twice as likely to experience wage 
freezes than the euro area member states, but that the reverse is true for pure indexation 
mechanisms. 18   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   













Austria 0.133  0.098  0.221 
Belgium 0.118  0.982  0.982 
Czech Republic  0.265  0.117  0.590 
Estonia 0.217  0.044  0.538 
Spain 0.024  0.548  0.707 
France 0.071  0.096  0.322 
Greece 0.125  0.200  0.426 
Hungary 0.059  0.112  0.315 
Ireland 0.087  0.095  0.318 
Italy 0.039  0.017  0.058 
Lithuania 0.199  0.108  0.486 
Netherlands 0.232  n.a.  n.a. 
Poland 0.100  0.069  0.307 
Portugal 0.150  0.090  0.509 
Slovenia 0.029  0.235  0.605 
Total  0.096 0.167  0.352 
Euro area  0.082 0.201  0.376 
Non-euro area  0.134 0.085  0.343 
 
Note: Proportion of firms having frozen wages over the past five years and applying an automatic or non-
automatic indexation mechanism; employment-weighted averages. 
 
Our next set of regressions examines the relationship between wage rigidities and the different 
margins of adjustment analysed above. First, we run probit regressions of the likelihood of using 
any margin, and each of the margins separately, and add measures of wage freezes and automatic 
indexation mechanisms to the set of covariates. A second set of regressions replaces the measure 
of formal indexation with our broader measure of indexation, including formal and informal 
arrangements. In all specifications we retain the basic set of control variables including country 
and sector fixed effects, the three indicators of labour force characteristics, firm size dummies, 
the share of temporary contracts and labour costs in total costs, indicators of perceived 
competition, and a set of dummies characterising the bargaining arrangement most prevalent in 
the firm.  
The first part of Table 7 presents the results for wage freezes and strict indexation rules, and 
indicates a clear positive association between nominal wage rigidity and the likelihood of using 
some of the margins of labour cost adjustment previously identified. Having experienced a wage 
freeze during the preceding five years increases the likelihood of using other margins of labour 
cost cutting by 23 pp. The effect is significant at the 1% level. This effect is relatively large, 
especially taking into account that it represents a lower bound of the true relationship between the 
two variables. Quite surprisingly, we find that firms applying a strict indexation rule are less 
likely to use some of the non-wage cost-cutting strategies. The marginal effect is much smaller in 
this case (-4 pp) than in the case of wage freezes, and only significant at the 10% level. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that the same factors that drive formal wage indexation   The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment: Survey Evidence from European Firms   19 
 
 
mechanisms at the firm level limit the use of other labour cost-cutting strategies. It should be 
noted, however, that when we replace the strict indexation rules for our indicator of “formal and 
informal” indexation (the second part of Table 7) the marginal effect is of small magnitude, and 
not statistically different from zero. 
When we move to the analysis of each margin considered separately, we find that a positive 
significant relation with nominal wage rigidity applies across the board. The marginal effects in 
Table 7 range from 15 pp in the case of slowing down promotions to 4 pp in the case of using 
early retirement to replace high wage workers with new entrants at lower wages. In all cases the 
marginal effects are statistically significant at the 1% level, and are virtually unchanged if we 
replace the indicator of strict indexation for formal/informal indexation in the second part of the 
table.  
Table 7:  The Relationship between the Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment, Wage Rigidities 
and Unionisation 
 
















Specification 1: nominal wage rigidity and strict (formal) indexation 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.227*** 0.126*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.153***  0.110*** 0.039*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.007) 
Strict  indexation  -0.039*  -0.033** -0.019*  -0.041** -0.053***  0.000  0.002 
    (0.057) (0.038) (0.086) (0.020) (0.000)  (0.980) (0.882) 
Only  outside  agreement  0.057***  0.028  0.027** 0.049** -0.022  0.013  0.044** 
    (0.008) (0.110) (0.042) (0.011) (0.142)  (0.472) (0.021) 
Only  firm  agreement  0.077*** 0.012  0.036*** 0.020  0.018  0.037*  0.075*** 
    (0.002) (0.497) (0.008) (0.278) (0.277)  (0.079) (0.000) 
Firm and outside 
agreement  0.075*** 0.032  0.032*  0.093*** -0.009  0.013  0.104*** 
    (0.005) (0.139) (0.068) (0.002) (0.637)  (0.575) (0.000) 
Observations  7302 7302 7302 5579 7006  7006 5870 
Specification 2: nominal wage rigidity and extended (formal and informal) indexation 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.230*** 0.131*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.159***  0.112*** 0.038*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Formal/informal 
indexation  0.004  -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010  0.008  -0.002 
    (0.740) (0.897) (0.258) (0.518) (0.276)  (0.486) (0.833) 
Only  outside  agreement  0.057***  0.028  0.026** 0.049** -0.023  0.013  0.044** 
    (0.009) (0.116) (0.045) (0.012) (0.137)  (0.477) (0.021) 
Only  firm  agreement  0.075*** 0.011  0.036*** 0.019  0.016  0.037*  0.076*** 
    (0.002) (0.525) (0.008) (0.302) (0.332)  (0.082) (0.000) 
Firm and outside 
agreement  0.074*** 0.032  0.032*  0.091*** -0.010  0.013  0.105*** 
    (0.006) (0.150) (0.070) (0.002) (0.597)  (0.561) (0.000) 
Observations  7308 7308 7308 5581 7012  7012 5876 
 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. 
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects, three indicators of labour force characteristics, 
three firm size dummies, the share of temporary contracts and labour costs in total costs and three 
dummies of perceived competition. 20   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   
All the regression specifications presented above control for the impact of unions including our 
usual set of dummy variables for the different types of predominant wage-bargaining regimes. 
The marginal effects of the union activity dummies remain significant, and are not substantially 
altered by the inclusion of the indicators of nominal and real rigidity. Parallel to this result, we 
have experimented with excluding the dummies for unions from the regressions, and the marginal 
effects of nominal rigidity and indexation we obtain are very similar.
9 Similarly, there are no 
significant changes when we either include or exclude in alternative specifications the indicator 
of union coverage. This suggests that, contrary to our initial expectations, the indicators of wage 
rigidity are capturing constraints at the time of wage setting that are not sufficiently explained by 
our indicators of unionisation. As regards the marginal effects of nominal wage freezes, these 
constraints seem even more important than those imposed by the wage-setting environment. 
6.  Conclusions 
We have examined the importance and determinants of six strategies firms might use to cut their 
labour costs, using a unique survey of European firms from 12 EU countries. These strategies are: 
reduce or eliminate bonus payments; reduce non-pay benefits; change shift assignments or shift 
premia; slow down or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; recruit new employees at a 
lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; and encourage early retirement to replace 
highly paid employees with entrants earning lower wages. 
We found substantial heterogeneity in the use of each of these strategies across countries and 
firms, depending on firm characteristics and labour market institutions. Not surprisingly, larger 
firms show greater room for manoeuvre with respect to using any of these strategies in order to 
adjust labour costs. Similarly, different indicators of the severity of competition suggest that firms 
in more competitive environments are more likely to engage in several of these strategies. We 
found that the presence of unions in wage setting is associated with greater use of most of the 
strategies. A plausible explanation is that unions limit the flexibility of wages, pushing firms 
towards alternative labour cost-cutting strategies. However, when we controlled for different 
indicators of wage rigidity (either nominal wage rigidity or alternative definitions of wage 
indexation) the impact of unionisation on the use of these different margins persists. Moreover, 
we find that firms subject to nominal wage rigidities are much more likely to use each of the six 
cost-cutting strategies. This indicates that there is some degree of substitutability between wage 
flexibility and the flexibility of other labour cost components, and that this substitutability is not 
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Appendix 2: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table A1: Country Composition of the Sample  
Country  Number of observations  Percent of total 
Belgium   1,431 12.01 
Czech Republic   399 3.35 
Estonia   366 3.07 
France   2,029 17.02 
Greece   402 3.37 
Hungary   2,006 16.83 
Ireland   985 8.26 
Italy   953 8 
Lithuania   337 2.83 
Poland   908 7.62 
Portugal   1,436 12.05 
Slovenia   666 5.59 
Non euro area  4,016 33.7 
Euro area  7,902 66.3 
Total 11,918  100 
 
Table A2: Sectoral Composition of the Sample 
Sector  Number of firms  Percent of total 
Manufacturing 5,057  42.66 
Energy 107  0.9 
Construction 932  7.86 
Trade 2,277  19.21 
Market services  3,064  25.85 
Financial intermediation  225  1.9 
Non-market services  192  1.62 
Total 11,854  100 
 
Table A3: Size Composition of the Sample 
Size  Number of firms  Percent of total 
5–19  2,895 24.29 
20–49  2,829 23.74 
50–199  3,793 31.83 
200+  2,401 20.15 
Total 11,918  100 




Table A4: Type of Union Contracts (% of Firms) 
   Only outside agreement  Only firm agreement  Both agreements 
Belgium   0.641 0.015  (N)  0.337 
Czech Republic   0.024 0.363  (D)  0.151 
Estonia   0.017 0.087  (D)  0.017 
France   0.413 0.001  (D)  0.585 
Greece   0.726 0.076  (N)  0.133 
Hungary   0.000 0.190  (D)  0.000 
Ireland   0.407 0.036  (N)  0.278 
Italy   0.568 0.001  (N)  0.428 
Lithuania   0.005 0.234  (D)  0.003 
Poland   0.015 0.182  (D)  0.032 
Portugal   0.517 0.030  (N)  0.069 
Slovenia   0.743 0.257  (N)  0.000 
Euro area  0.535  0.016     .  0.402 
Non euro area  0.014  0.216     .  0.046 
Total  0.352  0.086     .  0.276 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Total and euro country 
aggregates exclude Germany. Country-level institutional information from Du Caju et al. (2008) in 
brackets: firm-level agreements: D = company level is dominant in the country, N = company level 
is not dominant in the country. 
 
 
Table A5: Share of Bonuses and Benefits in Total Wage Bill 
   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Belgium   0.077 0.14 
Czech Republic   0.206 0.13 
Estonia   0.140 0.15 
France   0.113 0.23 
Greece   0.085 0.06 
Hungary   0.109 0.13 
Ireland   0.122 0.25 
Italy   0.069 0.14 
Lithuania   0.172 0.22 
Poland   0.155 0.16 
Portugal   0.322 0.23 
Slovenia   0.173 0.22 
Euro area  0.096 0.19 
Non euro area  0.160 0.16 
Total 0.113  0.18 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Total and euro country 
aggregates exclude Germany. 
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Table A6: Sample Statistics 
Variable   Mean 
Number of 
observations 
Some margin (one of the following 6 
strategies)  0.581 11,483 
Reduce bonuses  0.226  11,483 
Reduce benefits  0.147  11,483 
Change shifts  0.191  9,170 
Slow promotions  0.206  11,086 
Cheaper hires  0.323  11,086 
Early retirement  0.165  11,086 
Low-skilled blue collar  0.383  11,688 
High-skilled blue collar   0.217  11,688 
Low-skilled white collar  0.172  11,688 
High-skilled white collar  0.228  11,688 
Exporting firms  0.505  10,511 
Share of labour costs  0.336  10,537 
Only outside agreement   0.352  11,665 
Only firm agreement  0.086  11,665 
Firm and outside agreement  0.276  11,665 
Temporary workers (%)  0.114  11,722 
Coverage  0.616 9,256 
Perceived comp = severe   0.399  9,256 
Perceived comp = strong   0.500  9,256 
Perceived comp = weak   0.073  9,256 
Perceived comp = none   0.029  9,256 
Price comp = very likely  0.172  9,815 
Price comp = likely  0.467  9,815 
Price comp = not likely  0.284  9,815 
Price comp = not at all  0.077  9,815 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Proportion of firms; 
except in the case of high-skilled and low-skilled blue and white-collar workers where the numbers 




Appendix 3: Employment-Adjusted Sampling Weight 
 
Formally, the employment-adjusted sampling weight is the product of three individual weights:  
3 2 1 w w w wl =  
1 w : adjusts for the unequal probability of firms being included in the intended sample, i.e. the 










N w  
h N : population of firms within each stratum 
*
h n : intended gross sample of firms within each stratum  
 













h n : realised sample of firms within each stratum, i.e. the actual number of firms that receive and 
reply to the questionnaire 
 









N w w 2 1  and corrects for the unequal probability of firms being included in the realised 
sample. 
 









L w3  
h L : is population employment in each stratum 
 
By combining the expressions for  1 w ,  2 w  and  3 w , we obtain the following expression for the 








L w . Therefore, the employment-adjusted weight is equal 
to the population employment in each stratum divided by the number of firms in each stratum in 
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Appendix 4: Questions Used for the Creation of the Variables 
Question 6 – Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation? 
Definition of base wage - direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, commissions, piecework 
payments).  
No   □ 
Yes  □ 
   
Question 7 – If “yes” in question 6, please select the options that best reflect the policy followed: 
Wage changes are automatically linked to:   
                             - past inflation   □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
Although there is no formal rule, wage changes take into account:   
                             - past inflation  □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
   
Question 14 – Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen?  
Definition of freeze in base wage – base wage in nominal terms remains unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next.  
    - No   □ 
    - Yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees)  _____% 
  
Question 18 – Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs?  
Please choose as many options as apply to your firm. 
Reduction or elimination of bonus payments  □ 
Reduction or elimination of non-pay benefits  □ 
Change in shift assignments   □ 
Slowdown or freeze of the rate at which promotions are filled  □ 
Recruitment of new employees (with similar skills and experience) at lower wage than 
those who left (e.g. due to voluntary quits and retirement)  □ 
Use of early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower wages  □ 
Other strategies (please specify) _______________________________________  □ 
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Appendix 5: Additional Results 
 
Table A7: Non-Wage Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment and Wage Rigidities 
















Low-skilled blue collar 
(%)  -0.027 -0.027 -0.033**  0.075***  -0.058***  -0.021 0.028 
    (0.348) (0.200) (0.028) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.365) (0.181) 
High-skilled blue collar 
(%) -0.012  -0.031 
-
0.061*** 0.058**  -0.011  0.005  0.027 
    (0.714) (0.200) (0.000) (0.023) (0.593)  (0.859) (0.270) 
Low-skilled white collar 
(%)  0.045  0.050* -0.022 0.027  0.034  -0.029 0.095*** 
    (0.256) (0.087) (0.293) (0.400) (0.211)  (0.405) (0.001) 
Exporting  firm  0.023*  0.020*  0.008 -0.012  -0.005  0.010 -0.008 
    (0.097) (0.058) (0.279) (0.302) (0.623)  (0.384) (0.364) 
Share of labour costs  0.053*  0.036  0.006  -0.028  0.032  0.049*  0.003 
    (0.099) (0.125) (0.714) (0.259) (0.126)  (0.059) (0.877) 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.227*** 0.126*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.152***  0.111*** 0.039*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.007) 
Strict  indexation  -0.035*  -0.032** -0.019  -0.039** -0.053***  0.006  0.005 
    (0.092) (0.042) (0.102) (0.025) (0.000)  (0.754) (0.726) 
Temporary  workers  (%)  0.015 0.012 0.024 0.056**  0.024  0.033 -0.074*** 
    (0.671) (0.640) (0.166) (0.038) (0.296)  (0.263) (0.006) 
Size=20–49  0.100*** 0.044*** 0.024**  0.046*** 0.046***  0.100*** 0.062*** 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.027) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=50–199  0.164*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.070***  0.115*** 0.089*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.230*** 0.101*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.098***  0.173*** 0.189*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Perceived comp – weak  0.084**  0.026  0.050*  0.026  0.001  0.109**  -0.019 
    (0.044) (0.446) (0.069) (0.444) (0.976)  (0.011) (0.462) 
Perceived comp – strong  0.117***  0.035  0.039*  0.026  0.022  0.106***  -0.045* 
    (0.002) (0.235) (0.084) (0.381) (0.379)  (0.003) (0.064) 
Perceived comp – severe  0.137***  0.022  0.045*  0.059*  0.020  0.128***  -0.010 
    (0.000) (0.450) (0.052) (0.055) (0.446)  (0.001) (0.676) 
Observations  7394 7394 7394 5639 7098  7098 5945 
 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. 
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects. 30   J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm 
 
   
Table A8: Non-Wage Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment and Wage Rigidities: Formal and 
Informal Indexation Rules 
 
















Low-skilled blue collar (%)  -0.025  -0.027  -0.033** 0.074*** -0.058***  -0.020  0.028 
    (0.386) (0.204) (0.025) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.395) (0.191) 
High-skilled blue collar 
(%) -0.011  -0.030 
-
0.061*** 0.058**  -0.012  0.006  0.027 
    (0.733) (0.207) (0.000) (0.024) (0.573)  (0.829) (0.271) 
Low-skilled white collar 
(%)  0.046  0.051* -0.022 0.028  0.035  -0.028 0.094*** 
    (0.245) (0.083) (0.292) (0.386) (0.193)  (0.416) (0.001) 
Exporting  firm  0.023*  0.021*  0.008 -0.012  -0.004  0.010 -0.008 
    (0.098) (0.053) (0.276) (0.314) (0.656)  (0.384) (0.362) 
Share of labour costs  0.054*  0.036  0.005  -0.030  0.033  0.050*  0.002 
    (0.091) (0.132) (0.774) (0.241) (0.117)  (0.058) (0.914) 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.231*** 0.130*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.158***  0.111*** 0.038*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Formal/ informal 
indexation  0.005  -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011  0.010  -0.000 
    (0.673) (0.892) (0.289) (0.468) (0.208)  (0.365) (0.994) 
Temporary  workers  (%) 0.015 0.013 0.024 0.057**  0.024  0.033 -0.075*** 
  (0.654) (0.614) (0.170) (0.036) (0.295)  (0.254) (0.006) 
Size=20–49  0.099*** 0.044*** 0.024**  0.046*** 0.045***  0.099*** 0.062*** 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=50–199  0.164*** 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.071***  0.114*** 0.089*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.230*** 0.100*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.100***  0.171*** 0.189*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Perceived comp – weak  0.082**  0.024  0.050*  0.024  -0.001  0.108**  -0.018 
    (0.049) (0.470) (0.073) (0.475) (0.977)  (0.012) (0.470) 
Perceived comp – strong  0.116***  0.034  0.038*  0.024  0.021  0.106***  -0.045* 
    (0.003) (0.252) (0.088) (0.422) (0.421)  (0.003) (0.065) 
Perceived comp – severe  0.136***  0.022  0.045*  0.057*  0.018  0.127***  -0.010 
    (0.000) (0.468) (0.055) (0.062) (0.476)  (0.001) (0.674) 
Observations  7400 7400 7400 5641 7104  7104 5951 
 
Note: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported.  
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects. 
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Appendix 6: Variable Definitions 
 
Proportion of low-skilled blue-collar employees. 
Proportion of high-skilled blue-collar employees. 
Proportion of low-skilled white-collar employees. 
Perceived comp – weak etc: Self-defined competition capturing firms’ perception regarding the 
intensity of product market competition. 
Implied comp – weak etc: implied competition. Inferred from the question on whether firms 
follow the price changes of their competitors.  
Exporting firm: Dummy taking the value of firms that report having revenues from exporting 
activity. 
Share of labour cost: Proportion of total costs that are due to labour costs. 
Proportion of temporary workers. 
Nominal wage rigidity: Downward nominal wage rigidity – whether firms have frozen wages in 
the last five years.  
Strict indexation: whether firms’ wages are automatically linked to past or expected inflation. 
Formal /informal indexation: whether firms’ wages are automatically or informally linked to past 
or expected inflation. 
Only outside agreement: Firms apply only an agreement concluded outside the firm. 
Only firm agreement: Firms apply only an agreement concluded within the firm. 
Firm and outside agreement: Firms apply both a firm and an outside agreement. 
Coverage: Indicates the proportion of workers covered by collective-bargaining contract(s). 
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